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Abstract: Aristotle (384-322 BC) was an ancient Greek philosopher, 
pupil of Plato, and tutor of Alexander the Great. His works span the 
topics of biology, metaphysics, mind, logic, language, science, 
epistemology, ethics, and politics. Aristotle held that there are many 
divine beings, but a sup emely divine being is the first cause of the 
universe and the goodness of all other beings. This divine being plays a 
fundamental explanatory role in Aristotle’s thought. 
1. Life and works
Aristotle was born in 384 BC in the Macedonian city of Stagira. Shortly 
after the death of his father Nichomachus, Aristotle traveled to Athens 
and studied with Plato (see wbiee0301) at the Academy.  By 342 BC he 
had become tutor to Alexander the Great. During Alexander’s conquest 
of Asia, Aristotle founded his own school in Athens: the Lyceum. After 
Alexander’s death, Aristotle fled to Chalcis where he died in 322 BC. 
It would be difficult to overstate Aristotle’s impact on philosophy. 
His views dominated the Western intellectual landscape following the 
recovery of his works in the medieval period, and views inspired and 
informed by Aristotle’s are prominent contenders in philosophy today.  
In addition to influencing philosophy through his substantive views, 
Aristotle helped shape the discipline by providing a way of partitioning 
philosophical inquiry. The fraction of his works we have are the first 
recorded systematic treatments of the subjects that still comprise major 
areas of philosophy: metaphysics, mind, logic, language, philosophy of 
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science, epistemology, ethics, and politics.
In dividing areas of philosophical inquiry Aristotle proceeds first 
according to the aim of the science. Theoretical sciences aim at 
knowledge of truth, practical sciences at action, and productive sciences 
at beautiful or useful products (Metaphysics E). The remaining divisions 
are based on differences between objects of study. The highest branch of 
science is theoretical and treats the noblest subjects: he calls this first 
philosophy. The question of what first philosophy consists in has special 
relevance here, since he indicates in his Metaphysics that it must be 
theology.  
2. Theology
In Metaphysics E 1 Aristotle makes the case for first philosophy as a 
study of “being qua being,” (1025b2). Sciences such as mathematics and 
natural philosophy, he argues, take for granted the existence and 
essences of their objects. But we must have a science that can pronounce 
on the question of whether these objects genuinely have being. Aristotle 
argues that natural philosophy and mathematics study being in a 
circumscribed way: natural philosophy treats changeable, material 
objects, and mathematics treats unchangeable, immaterial objects.  An 
architectonic science will uncover the principles and causes of being in 
the unqualified sense (that is, not just as material or as changeable, but 
as being). If there is something that exhibits being in an unqualified way, 
then the science of this must be prior to natural philosophy and 
mathematics. He concludes that there must be three theoretical sciences: 
natural philosophy, mathematics, and theology (1026a19-20). Aristotle 
concludes by noting how this placement of theology fits the general 
methodological principle that “the most honorable science must deal 
with the most honorable class of subject”; since the divine is the noblest 
thing, study of the divine is the noblest science (1026a21-22). 
What Aristotle means by “theology” is difficult to discern, both 
because it is not what we typically mean when we use the term and 
because of an interpretive problem it appears to create. Some interpreters 
attribute to Aristotle inconsistent views about the enterprise of first 
Page 2 of 10The Encyclopedia of Philosophy of Religion
For Review Only
3
philosophy based on his remarks about theology in Metaphysics E 
(Bonitz 1890). If theology is first philosophy, then its subject matter is 
circumscribed to one kind of being, namely, the divine. But if first 
philosophy studies being universally, then all beings should fall under its 
purview. On what is called the developmental reading, the claim that 
first philosophy is theology belongs in Aristotle’s earlier thought, which 
is less developed and closer to that of his teacher, Plato (Jaeger 1948). 
On what is called the deflationary reading, “being qua being” is a 
property, and so study of this will not entail any ontological 
commitments about beings such as god, but rather operates at the 
conceptual level (Owens 1951).  
Recently the debate about whether Aristotelian theology is about 
universal or circumscribed being has seen renewed interest in the 
Thomistic and Averroist interpretations. On a prominent Thomistic 
reading, there are many modes of being, but first philosophy studies, 
primarily, the core mode. The supremely divine being exemplifies this 
mode, therefore the proper ontological object of first philosophy is the 
divine (see eopr0295, eopr0038, eopr0024). However, an understanding 
of all other modes of being (e.g. being qua material being) is parasitic on 
understanding of being qua being; and so by studying that which 
exhibits being in the focal sense, first philosophy will also shed light on 
all other kinds of being (Frede 1987, Duarte 2007). 
3. The Unmoved-Mover 
In his study of universal being, Aristotle aims to give an account of 
reality that preserves the appearances, adequately explains its 
foundations, and make progress in solving certain perennial puzzles. In 
doing so, Aristotle finds need to invoke the divine at several points. 
He conceives of the divine as a first cause of the universe. To the 
modern ear, it is easy to hear this as signaling a cosmological argument 
(see eopr0282), as though the divine causes the event of creation by 
preceding it. But Aristotle believes that the universe is eternal; thus there 
is no need to bring in a divine being to explain its beginning (Physics 
VIII). Additionally, Aristotle claims there are four kinds of cause, each 
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of which must be invoked to give a full account of the universe. 
Efficient, material, formal, and final causes must be put to work in a 
complete account (Metaphysics Γ). In a complete account of an oak tree, 
Aristotle will invoke the wood the tree is made of as the material cause, 
the acorn as the efficient cause of the tree’s coming to be, the form of 
the oak as the formal cause in virtue of which the tree belongs to that 
kind, and the best life-activity of the oak as the final cause— that for the 
sake of which it possesses certain powers and actualizes them. 
We might think that Aristotle could give an account of the universe 
without any first cause by identifying the four causes for each kind of 
thing in a piecemeal way. But Aristotle sees two questions such an 
account would not answer: (1) How do the finite motions of finite 
entities compose an infinite series of motions? (2) What determines the 
natures of those entities? He argues that there must be an unmoved-
mover: a being whose motion can explain the motion of all movable 
things, but whose motion does not itself require further explanation. 
Secondly, according to Aristotle, everything in nature tends toward the 
realization of its end because that end is good and desirable 
(Metaphysics Λ 8). But what explains the desirability of all finite ends 
is their resemblance to, and participation in, an infinite good or end. The 
unmoved-mover is supremely desirable, not wanting for anything; it 
moves everything else in the universe by being supremely good and 
desirable, such that other things seek to imitate it. 
4. Pure actuality
In the argument for the unmoved-mover, Aristotle invokes the notion of 
motion. A complete metaphysics will have to give an account of what 
motion is. For Aristotle, motion is a kind of change, and an 
understanding of the principles of change is the key to understanding 
composite material beings. Here again, Aristotle’s supremely divine 
being plays a key role. 
Aristotle develops his theory of change such that it is equipped to 
solve a series of Presocratic puzzles. The Eleatic philosophers 
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Parmenides and Zeno famously argue that a rational investigation of the 
matter gives the lie to the apparent reality of change (Physics VII). 
Parmenides famously asserts the principle that we cannot reason or 
speak sensibly about nonbeing; for nonbeing does not exist, so there is 
nothing for us to speak or reason about with respect to nonbeing. This 
principle proves to be an obstacle to explaining the kind of change that 
occurs when something comes into existence. For example, if I brew a 
pot of coffee in the morning it seems a change has occurred: when I 
woke, there was no coffee, but now there is. To countenance this 
change, though, I have to refer to the nonbeing of the coffee when I 
woke up, violating Parmenides’ principle. Suppose we concede to 
Parmenides that there is no change from nothing to something, but we 
still want to countenance changes in the properties of existing things. 
When my coffee sits on the counter for an hour, it changes from being 
hot to cold. Here too, unfortunately, we will have to speak of nonbeing. 
For my coffee must have been not cold at an earlier time to have become 
cold at a later time. Thus again, I must violate Parmenides’ principle to 
countenance the property change. 
Aristotle’s positive account of change gets around this latter 
problem by invoking three concepts: potentiality, actuality, and 
substance. Substance is the being that undergoes the change and persists 
through it. Potentiality is a power to be affected or to be otherwise. 
Actuality is what is present and existing (Metaphysics Θ 6, 1048b1). 
Here is the important move: every potentiality is a potential to be some 
actuality, and every potentiality is grounded in the existence of some 
actuality in a substance. For instance, my coffee has the actual property 
hot when first brewed; in virtue of what it is actually, namely hot, it is 
potentially cold. We can correctly say that it is not cold, since hot and 
cold are contraries, but we are not ascribing the nonexistent property 
“not-cold” to the coffee. When the coffee becomes cold, the potentiality 
to be cold becomes an actuality. So Aristotle can explain change without 
violating Parmenides’ principle in referring to nonbeing. Simply put, in 
any change, there is a substance, x, that persists through the change, an 
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actual property, G, in virtue of which the substance has the potentiality 
to be F, and the actuality F, which the substance acquires in the change. 
Aristotle explains that pure actuality—something that is not in 
potentiality in any respect—must be invoked to ground changes like this. 
Every actuality is prior “in form and substance” to a corresponding 
potentiality. “Thus it is obvious by this argument that actuality is prior in 
substantiality to potentiality, and that in point of time, as we have said, 
one actuality presupposes another right back to that of the prime mover 
in each case,” (1050b4-6). Since change always involves potentiality as 
well as actuality, and potentiality is always potentiality for some 
actuality, every change requires for its explanation some actuality, and 
this will be true until we get to the case of the formal and final cause of 
change that is not itself susceptible to change: the unmoved-mover.   
5. Mind
What does pure actuality look like? Aristotle’s answer again invokes the 
divine unmoved-mover.
In characterizing actuality, Aristotle first distinguishes complete and 
incomplete activities. Motion is an incomplete activity. Motions like 
building a house involve potentiality, because that for the sake of which 
it occurs—erecting the house— has not yet come to be as long as the 
motion is happening. A complete activity, like thinking, is complete 
while ongoing because its end is contained in the activity (Metaphysics I 
4). Since the supremely divine being is purely actual, it cannot be in 
motion. The kind of actuality it exhibits must be complete activity. 
Moreover, because the divine being is the ultimate final end of the 
universe, it must be the best thing there is. So its activity will be the best 
kind of activity. 
The best activity, according to Aristotle, is contemplation (noesis). 
His rationale for this unfolds in his De Anima. In the first two books, he 
has used the hylomorphic account of change to explain the activities that 
characterize plants and animals—nutrition and perception; then he 
extends this account to explain the activity characteristic of human 
beings—thought/contemplation. While activities like perceiving require 
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bodily organs (eyes, ears, etc.), contemplation is superior because it 
operates through no bodily organ. 
In a passage that has been the site of a long controversy, Aristotle 
says that there must be a kind of thought that doesn’t merely understand 
all things, but which produces other things by bringing them from 
potentiality to actuality (De Anima III 5). That which engages in such 
contemplation is “in its essence actuality.” And because the best kind of 
activity is this kind of thought. The Averroists argue that Aristotle is 
indicating that the unmoved-mover will be this superior kind of thought; 
Aquinas and other interpreters in the Christian tradition reject this 
reading, maintaining instead that thought-thinking-itself refers to the 
activity of the immortal human soul.
6. Practical philosophy
Aristotle’s supremely divine being is the universe’s final end. Ends have 
the character of goodness for Aristotle (see eopr0154). So the goodness 
that belongs to this being is the good itself; its goodness is “the cause to 
other goods of their being good” (Eudaemian Ethics I 8, 1217b5). 
 Aristotle claims that the supremely divine being enjoys the best kind 
of life, exemplifying goodness to the maximal degree. In Metaphysics Λ, 
for instance, he says that life is most fully realized in the activity of 
rational thought; the best kind of rational thought is of the highest 
objects, and as the supremely divine being continuously engages in such 
thought, it exhibits the best kind of life. Additionally, the supremely 
divine being’s life is also most pleasant, as active contemplation is the 
most pleasant activity. This idea is the basis of the account of pleasure. 
Pleasure on his view attends activity, and the more godlike the activity, 
the more proper and better the pleasure attendant on it. Lower beings 
like humans participate in pleasure by enacting what is most divine in 
them (Nicomachean Ethics VII 8). 
The supremely divine being’s life sets a standard according to which 
other lives are judged. Aristotle characterizes the final end a human life 
aims at as what we call “happiness,” (1095a19). As he fills out his 
account of happiness it becomes clear that the happiness humans enjoy 
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can only be understood as an approximation of the life of the supremely 
divine being. As he explains, “If then, the happiness which God always 
enjoys is as great as that which we enjoy sometimes, it is marvelous; and 
if it is greater, this is still more marvelous” (Metaphysics Λ 1072b29-
30). Since the supremely good and happy life is the life of 
contemplation, and human beings are able to engage in contemplation, 
the best human life will be the life of contemplation (Nicomachean 
Ethics X 8, 1179a). 
Aristotle argues that virtue—good habits or character traits—are 
necessary for human happiness. By acquiring and exercising virtues, we 
enact what is most divine in us. Only if we have the virtues will we feel 
pleasure in performing the best kinds of activities, and so our lives will 
more closely resemble the supremely pleasant, active life of the divine.  
For Aristotle, ethical inquiry prepares the way for the science of 
politics. His idea is that the good of individuals is subordinated to and 
ordered to the good of a political community. And so it is necessary to 
understand what is good for individual human beings, that is, happiness, 
to rightly order human communities. To the extent that the supremely 
divine being plays a role in grounding Aristotle’s ethics, it also grounds 
his politics.  
While contemplation is the best theoretical activity for a human 
being, what about the best practical activity? Political action 
approximates divine activity more closely than does individual action 
because it “secures the good of the state… a nobler and more divine 
achievement,” (Nicomachean Ethics I 2). Its object is a higher good—
the good of the whole community—than the object of individual 
action—an individual’s good. 
Aristotle admits that the best kind of political constitution is not 
likely achievable. Instead he characterizes such an arrangement as the 
city of our prayers (see eopr0310). Perhaps the implication is that some 
divine help would be necessary for its realization. In this city, every 
citizen has complete virtue and works towards a good nobler than her 
own, namely, the common good of all citizens. 
Aristotle does not think humans can enjoy complete friendship with a 
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divine being, because even a virtuous human being is unequal to the 
divine. Aristotle likens the relationship of humans and the divine to the 
friendship between a parent and child (Nicomachean Ethics VIII 14). 
Even by honoring the divine being, a human does not give the being 
what it deserves. Nevertheless, he says, a human can be called virtuous 
if she renders the divine being all she can. Finally, Aristotle thinks 
humans most nearly resemble the divine being when engaged in the 
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